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THE SETTING 
The negotiation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement among the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada is a major initiative for the 
first two nations, less important to the third. 
The treaty changes United States-Mexican rela-
tions and how Mexico sees itself. The authors 
of the following articles on energy policy, finan-
cial services, agriculture, economic liberaliza-
tion, impact on North American manufactur-
ers, and the others clarify important issues. 
As Amy Card explains, Mexican national 
sentiment after independence grew from 
national impotence. Invasion, subjugation, and 
dismemberment provoked a national rage. 
Europeans inflicted the first wounds. In 1519, 
Hernan Cortes led the conquest of Mexico, a 
dramatic episode in Western expansion, a sad 
event for Mexicans. Their vision of the past is 
unfamiliar to most readers of this journal, 
because Americans trace national origins to 
Massachusetts Puritans, Pennsylvania 
Germans, or Virginia planters and slaves, not 
Squanto and Massasoit, Amoroleck, or 
Tecumseh. On the eve of conquest, the aborig-
inal population of Mexico was 16-25 million 
people; in the present United States, only 4-5 
million people lived. 
Most contemporary Mexicans descend part-
ly from Native Americans. Mexican culture heroes 
are the defeated Aztecs and other aboriginal peo-
ples. The Spanish were the occupiers who dom-
inated Mexico for three hundred years. Because 
of the mestizo nation's revulsion for Spanish 
rule, there is no public monument in Mexico to 
Cortes, a major figures of world history. 
After independence, Mexicans' humilia-
tions continued. In the 1830s, Mexico endured 
one French invasion; and in the 1860s, 
Napoleon III sent another force to create a pup-
pet empire there. The presence of the dupe 
Maximillian further shamed the people, 
although the resistance to French penetration 
of Benito Juarez was a cause for pride. 
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The most grievous national wound after 
independence came from the United States, 
causing pain and dishonor. In 1846, President 
James K. Polk launched a war of agression 
against Mexico, which Americans call Manifest 
Destiny. Polk took the northern half of Mexico, 
now the American southwest and California, 
leaving his southern neighbor ashamed and 
resentful. 
In 1914, the northern colossus occupied 
Vera Cruz because President Wilson wished to 
remove military dictator Victoriano Huerta. In 
1916, Wilson sent General John J. Pershing and 
thousands of soldiers to Mexico to chastise 
Pancho Villa, which Mexicans thought chal-
lenged their legitimate right to revolution. 
American violations of Mexican sovereignty 
heightened hostility to the United States. 
Official affronts reinforced the private rages of 
Mexicans, second-class citizens in their own 
country. Until1911, humble Mexicans lost jobs 
to foreigners on Mexican railways, foreign-
owned mines, and agricultural properties. In 
the late 1800s, alien pastimes like baseball and 
bicycling replaced Mexican leisure traditions 
like the charreada. 
Insurgents remembered these insults dur-
ing the Epic Revolution of 1910-1940. Mexican 
nationalism meant anti-Americanism, anti-for-
eignism, pro-Indian sentiments, and left-wing 
political rhetoric. Mexicans long blamed the 
United States for many evils; but in the 1940s, 
relations between the two countries improved. 
During World War II, each found advantage in 
cooperating with the other. Since 1945, rela-
tions have been generally proper, although the 
United States remained a scapegoat for men like 
President Luis Echeverria, who wished to 
deflect criticism from his own failings. 
Sensitive Mexicans resented American cultur-
al penetrations like hamburguesas and beisbol. 
Mexico announced its independence from the 
United States in international forums. On such 
symbolic issues as the recognition of Castro's 
Cuba and the United Nations' equation of 
Zionism and racism, Mexico's policies were 
anti-American. 
The negotiation of the NAFTA was a state-
ment of need and of friendship between Mexico 
and the United States, who have often had lit-
tle to be friendly about. Although the 
economies of the two nations have been inter-
dependent since the nineteeth century, 
Mexicans disliked admitting it. The decision of 
President Carlos Salinas de Goratari to marry 
his country's economy with the United States' 
is momentous. Salinas's vigorous campaign to 
persuade his countrymen to embrace the 
United States recalls an era of comity unseen 
since the days of President Porfirio Dfaz (served 
1876-80, 1884-1911). 
Another clue to the sea change in Mexican 
public life that the NAFTA symbolizes is the 
break with the progressive and statist political 
traditions of the Mexican Revolution. Mexicans 
memorialize such revolutionaries as Emiliano 
Zapata and Francisco Villa, who fought for the 
rights of humble people against the interests of 
the rich and powerful in and out of Mexico. 
Revolutionary proclamations of social justice 
are expressed in the Constitution of 1917 and 
veneration of the acts of President Lazaro 
Cardenas in the 1930s. 
The Constitution was a revolutionary 
weapon, not a document approved by the elec-
torate in the manner of the constitution of the 
United States; but it nevertheless articulated 
national aspirations. The 1917 Constitution 
said that land belonged to the people and must 
be restored to them, implying the illegitimacy 
of possession by large landholders. Peasants' 
claims to lands taken by liberal governments in 
the 1850s and by Dfaz in the late nineteenth 
century must be returned to them. 
Constitutionally, the Mexican people regained 
proprietary rights to subsoil minerals, a theory 
of public ownership that echoed the silver-plat-
ed colonial era, where the Crown claimed every-
thing beneath the earth. The Constitution also 
ordered the government to protect the rights 
of urban laborers. 
From 1917-1934, the governments of 
Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obregon, and 
Plutarco Elfas Calles and his puppets only halt-
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ingly implemented the progressive ideals of the 
constitution. Mexican capitalists in the coun-
tryside and the cities prospered, then and later. 
Still, national leaders were "Revolutionaries," 
and policymakers often spoke like Eastern 
European radicals. The state's role in the econ-
omy expanded. 
The apex of the Revolution was the presi-
dency of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), father 
of Cuatehmoc Cardenas, Salinas' opponent in 
1988. The elder Cardenas pushed land reform 
and nationalized oil. He restored to the people 
44 million acres of land, more than all previous 
Revolutionary presidents combined. He also 
promoted ejidos, which looked to Americans 
suspiciously like Soviet collectives. In 1938, he 
responded to the arrogant foreign, especially 
but not exclusively American, oil interests. He 
expropriated their holdings, fulfilling the 
Constitution's dream. No American interven-
tion followed. The growing importance of a 
non-hostile Mexico in a world on the brink of 
war and the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt meant that Americans would not 
reassert oil-company claims. 
After 1940, Mexico moved to the political 
right, as the governments of Manuel Avila 
Camacho, Miguel Aleman, and their successors 
chose industrialization. Continued reliance on 
agriculture for Mexico's well-being, they could 
see, would fail. Thus, the so-called Institutional 
Revolution began in 1940. The government 
generally favored the interests of Mexican mer-
chants and industrialists over those of peasant 
farmers and workers, but it seldom said that it 
did. Although organized labor was officially 
favored, its leaders were coopted and fell silent. 
Labor leaders joined the official party, the PRI, 
which dominated the government. That 
Mexico's left-wing rhetoric was unmatched by 
practices of business and government was often 
hard for foreigners to see and sometimes for-
gotten by Mexicans, especially those who 
worked for the government or the PRI. 
Mexico's decision to join the United States 
and Canada in a free-trade area reverses decades 
of nationalist denunciation of the northern 
neighbor and implies a rejection of Mexico's sta-
tist traditions. In August, 1993, Mexico reiter-
ated its pro-American position, emphasizing its 
about-face by accepting American demands for 
stronger environmental and labor provisions 
and trade sanctions. President Salinas opened 
himself to condemnation as a vendepatria, a 
sell-out, especially if his initiative failed. His 
relinquishing of even a bit of national autono-
my would have been unthinkable a decade ago. 
At this writing, the future of the NAFTA is 
in doubt. Its opponents in the United States are 
many. Ross Perot has found in denouncing the 
NAFTA another way to keep his name before the 
public. Concerned about the loss of jobs to low-
wage competitors south of the border, American 
labor leaders oppose it. Many organizations 
devoted to improving the environment are 
adding their voices to the opposition, although 
the National Wildlife Federation and the 
Environmental Defense Fund hope that the 
NAFTA will help Mexico join the United States 
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to control pollution rather than add to the prob-
lem, in the manner analyzed by Tom Burke in 
his useful essay. 
Opponents of the NAFTA might yet pre-
vail, in the short run. But the pressures that 
pushed Mexican and American leaders to the 
conference table will persist even if Congress 
rejects the document. The needs of both coun-
tries for a closer economic relationship are too 
profound. If the NAFTA fails, creative men and 
women on both sides of the border must effect 
the mutual cooperation of the treaty in other 
ways. 
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